

# *Issues of identity and securitization in the Post-Soviet space*

## *Introduction*

The expansion of the notion of globality is contextualized with issues of security and construction of identity. As the global lurks into the multilayers of our identities, notions of (in)security appear and, therefore, need to be addressed. In this paper I will try to explore the issues generated by globalization, in constructions of identity, in conjunction with critical security studies and ontological security. Threats and anxiety constitute the core of concern of critical security studies, in an attempt to include emotions as a discipline throughout the discourse. Patterns of security issues appear throughout the world, in the concept of conflict, war and crisis, especially when the usual pattern sometimes is a postcolonial back round. Identity issues arise, as feelings of belonging and becoming are structured around different types of trauma. I inspect the cases of Chechnya and Crimea in the post-Soviet space, where national identity is being resurrected and reconstructed to cope with the vast and rapid changes of the global scene. I will try to connect the post-colonial theory to the post-soviet space by looking into Russia's imperialistic sentiments and how the Russian government framed the secessionist movements in both Chechnya and Crimea, according to their territorial, economic and political interests. Even though we do not speak of colonization per se, the strong separatist movements, the rhetoric of the previous regime as well as the violence used against the secessionist movements in the regions resembles any other colonialist systemic repression tactics around the world. The sift between how identity is structured by the colonialist power to support the establishing regime as well as all the other supporting mechanisms that are strategically used to maintain it are very much threatening the security of the ones subjected to it. Lastly, part of my analysis includes Feminist Security Studies and how they question the legitimizing of power structures and therefore the discourses they create around critical security studies. There has been an effort to critically stand against orthodox IR perceptions and studies of security, addressing threat, generated risk, anxiety, insecurity and crisis. Understanding that these discourses are gendered, and therefore are conceiving the masculine narrative as hegemonic in relation to creation, perpetration and institutionalization of crisis, is vital. (Runyan and Peterson, 2014)

## ***I. Definitions***

Before I present the cases of Chechnya and Crimea, I would like to establish some definitions according to which I will be grounding my analysis. Firstly, in an attempt to define the post-colonial we might say that it is the socioeconomic, political as well as cultural reconstruction of a region that has been colonized. Under the umbrella of critical security studies though, Barkawi and Laffey would argue that it is a Eurocentric reproduction of world narratives and how this defines the conception and practices of securitization. (Barkawi and Laffey, 2006)

Secondly, defining identity in a globalized era is a compelling task but according to Scholte, identities are “constructions of being, belonging and becoming- hold key significance in terms of both defining the self and forging collective bonds with others. Moreover, structures of identity have far-reaching implications for resource distributions, regulatory apparatuses and citizenship. Not surprisingly, then, identities often lie at the heart of, and give shape to, political struggles.” (Scholte,224) The construction of identities and how they could be influenced or even manipulated and used to legitimize political stances is one of the key points of this paper.

Leading to the ways these identities can be provided with securitization, we reach the third point I wish to clarify, and this is Critical Security Studies. According to the traditional International Relations view of security the state is perceived as the atom towards which all our concerns on security are centered. Security entails a logic that is exclusionary and violent, limiting individual freedom and constructing a narrow vision of national community that serves the interests of the state machinery. (Browning and McDonald,2011) Taking into account the postmodernist approach to security we focus on the construction of threat in liberal societies therefore the state remains the central point of all discourses. From the normative emancipation of the Welsh school to the more analytical securitization of the Copenhagen school we reach a point where the extension of what we perceive as a threat is still not enough to capture the insecurity of the human existence. (Ibid:241) As the spectrum of threats does open, including emotions, focusing on societal rather than state security, the Paris school focused on how security is practiced in our everyday lives, focusing on technological and bio political security practices manifested in various forms of surveillance. Unfortunately we fail to see the obvious: most critical security narratives constitute a Eurocentric bias paying not enough attention to an intersectional analysis of different societies around the world.( Barkawi and Laffey,2006) Colonialism does still exist in mere fractions and structures in post-colonial societies, constructing identities, or rather deconstructing them, as the civilized European identity rises above all. These identities are used and marginalized rather for the construction and

preservation of the Eurocentric identity, which is defined by the “uncivilized other”. Yet this “uncivilized other” is most of

the times not heard, leaving the discourse around critical security studies with quite inadequate understanding of the knowledge. Therefore the need appears to address subordination not only in an economic or political but also in a cultural context. (Ibid: 330 ) In assistance to this, taking into consideration experiences of insecurity that derive from day- to-day untapped threats, ontological security studies strives to grasp the security of being. According to Giddens (1991) “the notion of ontological security ties in closely to the tacit character of practical consciousness [...]. On the other side of what might appear to be quite trivial aspects of day-to-day action and discourse, chaos lurks. And this chaos is not just disorganization, but the loss of a sense of the very reality of things and of other persons.”

A fourth point I should specify that is integral to my analysis is the position of conflict and crisis. Crisis, according to Vigh, “is an experience of temporary abnormality primarily related to traumatic events such as violence, disease or bereavement.” (Vigh, 2008) It refers to the disorientation or disruption caused by interaction of internal and external forces and it involves a period of extreme difficulty to be dealt and overcome. Might be religious, political, economic, cultural or natural and through different stages causes disruptions to a person’s sense of self. It is usually associated with a spatial and temporary bracketing of the normality of life, which is expected to be reconfigured, or maybe even improved after the crisis is over.

Last but not least, secession is the concept that both cases of Chechnya and Crimea have been constructed around. Secessionism is mostly defined as the “formal withdrawal from an established, internationally recognized state by a constituent unit to create a new, sovereign state” or similarly “a demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereign status.”(Rukhadze and Duerr, 2010) Both cases of Chechnya and Crimea include violence in the way the secessions has been carried out.

## ***II. Cases***

### *Chechnya*

The separatist movement started taking form when Dzhokhar Dudayev became president of Chechnya in 1991 and according to his strong nationalist views, the region needed to be independent. It wasn't until later, in 1993 when the Chechen government declared independence from Russia and pursuing to deny any official participation in political or economic functions of the Russian state. By boycotting several referendums, refusing to pay taxes and sign treaties the government of Chechnya created rising tension between the region and the center. This build up led to official war in the winter of 1994, with the Russian forces managing to invade and capture Grozny 4 months later in 1995. Horrible casualties have taken place, with actions of extreme violence between both sides but also against civilians and reporters trying to cover the events therefore many of the crimes committed are not fully known (Ignatieff 2000) ( Rukhadze and Duerr, 2010) With the Khasav-Yurt agreement all Russian troops withdrew from Chechnya, ending the first Chechen War having a the huge human cost of up to 100.000 Chechens including civilians but also military. (Ibid: 37)

Unfortunately the post-war and incredibly fragile de facto state had political instabilities with groups of Chechen or Arab militia acting against the government, with the motivation and support of Chechen warlords. As more political violence and invasions in other parts of the Northern Caucasus spread, bearing the face of religious extremism, the Chechen government tried to deny any involvement. Russia, on the other hand undoubtedly blamed the Chechen government, and by bombing Dagestan and invading Chechnya, the Second Chechen War launched, on the summer of 1999. (Ibid: 39,40)

### *Crimea*

We might pin point as the begging of the end on February 2014, when president of Ukraine Viktor F. Yanukovyc, fled the country under the pressure of the Maiden riots in Kiev. Pro-Russian protests also took place in the Autonomous republic of Crimea, leading to Russian forces seizing government buildings in Simferopol. (Bowring, 2018) Earlier on 2013, president Yanukovyc gave in to Russian pressures and did not sign an association agreement with the European Union. (Biersack and O'Leal, 2014) This sparked protests which rapidly became violent, as protesters demanded for closer relations with the European Union. (Ibid: 248) By the end of February 2014 a new government was formed, supporting pro-European sentiments and promising to sign

the association agreement the previous government denied to endorse. In response to losing an important ally in its periphery, the Russian government condemned the new Ukrainian government as an EU driven coup. As the EU and USA supported the new government, positioning Ukraine in the middle of their geopolitical battleground, the Russian government kept portraying the Ukrainian government as neo-Nazis.

(Ibid:249) Simultaneously, the whole Crimean peninsula was overrun by Russian troops, which initially was denied by the Russian government up until the April of 2014 when president Putin acknowledged the troops as Russian. (Bowring, 2018)

On March 2014, a referendum was held questioning whether the people of Crimea would prefer to be part of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state or be part of Ukraine. The option of Crimea maintaining the status quo as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within the Ukrainian state was not in question. (Ibid: 26)

After the official announcement of the referendum the Supreme Council of Crimea declared the formal independence of the Republic of Crimea, and was recognized by the Russian Federation as a sovereign and independent state. (Ibid: 27)

### ***III. Discussion***

#### *Post-colonialist theory and Russia*

A first step in my analysis would be connecting the post-colonial theory to the stance of the Russian government throughout the years, on matters of securitization. Russia perceived, while in Soviet Union as the center, as the strongest country member of the Union. Member states of the former Soviet Union have generated strong bonds with the Russian state at the time, bonds that still remain until today. These bonds are based on, for instance, the use of the Russian language by most state officials in all of the member states. The dynamics of these bonds though remind more of the relationship between a hegemonic power and a following obedient state than a partnership or an alliance that a federal state should have. Russia has held a position of authority approaching security issues by constructing everything around the identity of the Russian man, whose well-being identifies with the well-being of the Russian state.(Biersack and O’Leal, 2018) Therefore in the face of threat, the Russian government has used all means available, from soft power strategic media manipulation to straightforward open fire, to preserve the state’s political and economic status quo.

In the case of Crimea, there are reported three narratives by Biersack and O’Leal that have been used by the Russian government that led to the annexation of Crimea. The first narrative initiates that Crimea has always been part of Russia, as expressed by the

president Vladimir Putin. This is “meant to evoke ties with Russia’s imperial past now reimagined in the present” (Biersack and O’Leal, 2018)

The second narrative exhibits that the People of Crimea did not support the new right wing government of Ukraine and they were labeled as neo- fascists by the Russian media and its periphery. Therefore, this is an attempt to touch upon sentiments of insecurity to intrigue the collective memory of former Soviet Union resistance to fascism under World War II. (Ibid: 254) Shared identity in Russia is defined in this discourse by the “other” the hegemonic right wing narrative of Ukraine’s new government, serving the Kremlin quite well, as it taps in the collective cultural memory of the former Soviet Union.

Last but not least, the third narrative concerns the initially unidentified troops seizing government buildings in February 2014. These troops, armed with Russian weapons, were denied any association with the Russian militia. It was later admitted by president Putin that they were indeed sent by the Russian government proving the willing of the pro-Russian Crimean government to take action and standing against the right-wing Ukrainian government they carried out the referendum proposing the secession of Crimea from Ukraine. This narrative was working more in favor of the Russian government to appeal to its own peoples, portraying itself as strong and decisive uniting the Russian nation beyond borders and reviving the fantasy of a pan Russian state. (Ibid: 224)

Through this first analysis notions of identity and how it is integral to the critical security studies discourse are starting to show. Consequently, does national identity provide enough representation of the narratives rising under situations of political crisis and instability?

### *National identity and Globalization*

An interesting point in Eriksen’s analysis of globalization and how it affects the construction of identity is that, according to him, globalization and localization go hand in hand. The global needs the local and thus creates entities such as nations and micro-nations, faith systems, cultural movements or ethnic groups that sometimes even lack a territorial bound. Some features of identity politics that he mentions are crucial in understanding how national identity is shaped but how it is also failing to provide for the structure of modern day multilayered notions of self.

Territorialism was mainly used in order to structure social space and was affiliated with nationalism, as a main structure of collective identity. Ethnic-states or nation-states have strived to maintain their status quo through this binary structure. Therefore, with the spread of supraterritoriality, the dynamics in this binary relationship have changed, leaving the collective identity exposed to external threats

and in desperate need of further identification. (Scholte, 225) Another point that creates secessionist movements in a globalized era is the tendency of the nation-state to exclude parts of other identities, rather than the national identity. Fulfillment of certain aspects of identity, as we see in both cases of Chechnya and Crimea, initiates the concept of a micro-nation as a much more suitable one, as it breaks away from a supraterritorial state and its practices to remain unified. (Scholte,234) On one hand, the state of Chechnya denied the Russian national identity because it is strongly correlated to religion nowadays, but also because of the practices and the violence Russian government used to suppress the separatist movements in the area. On the other hand, the state of Crimea was led by the Putin administration to break away from the Ukrainian state because of their delicate national identity and the appeal of a stronger, Russian identity. Pre-existing local realities and practices do not seem to serve wholesomely the structure of an identity as it did in the past, under milder globalization circumstances. This, according to Eriksen, “confirms the hypothesis that in a global information society, flexible networks are a superior mode of organization to the territorially based hierarchy.” Especially in the case of the former Soviet Union, where all borders were closed to the outside world in an attempt to maintain a stable regime, the shock of opening up to a globalized market, flow of information and political ideas, is still echoing today.

The aspect of crisis in both cases is crucial, as time and space stretch, creating a sense of instability. The secessionist movements in Chechnya were refueled by the extreme violence and atrocities the Russian government committed, against not only Chechen militia but also civilians. This constant state of terror marks unavoidably day-to-day functions and feelings of self, community and reality. In addition, the concept of threat is constructed and even though at periods actual threat does not exist, notions of identity have been crafted around it and as a result, one cannot conceive its own self without it, living in a constant state of defense. What is thought-provoking is the construction of threat by the Russian Government in the case of Crimea. By painting the face of the Ukrainian government as extremely right-wing and by associating it to fascism, threat against rights and liberties of the Crimean people was successfully established. Therefore retreating back to more stable, familiar notions of self would provide at least a little sense of security.

Another interesting point is the use of identity politics by the Russian government, in both cases in an attempt to underline the crucial importance of a sense of belonging and not-yet lost dignity, through nostalgia and anachronistic attempts, in the post-Soviet space. (Eriksen, 158) In addition, these attempts are being conceptualized through symbolism and rhetoric that derive from the political culture and try to evoke psychological involvement and personal experience. (Ibid:160) Channeling the “soviet man” that fought against fascism and Nazism in World War II, the Russian narrative aims to provoke unifying sentiments across the country, creating a new enemy bearing the face of terrorism in Chechnya. Furthermore, part of visualizing the “other”, the enemy, is to raise any differences that stand out in a complex modern day

society. Via simplification, and by fixating on certain aspects of a collective identity (religion, mother-tongue, territorial boundaries) it is easier to construct a notion of self, opposed to the often demonized “Other” (Ibid:160)

### *Bracketing or widening Securitization?*

In an attempt to frame security issues in both cases, we find ourselves critical towards the traditional realist approaches of security, as the nation state has appeared inadequate in providing security for the whole spectrum of multiple identities that construct notions of self in this era.

According to Browning and McDonald, there are two main concerns that articulate our critique. Firstly, the politics of security follow the pattern of recognition and representation of different identities and legitimizing certain actors as providers of security. (Browning and McDonald, 2011) Secondly, the ethics of security, concern the dynamics and nature of securitizing and how it is conceptualized and practiced. Under this spectrum we try to frame the securitization discourse in a different way, as for it to be more inclusive. Concerning the politics of security we have seen in the cases of Chechnya and Crimea, the way existential threat that was represented by the Russian government was critical to the legitimization of pervasive enactment of violence in both areas. An effective way to shape the public opinion in order to legitimize the use of violence was for the Putin administration to use soft power politics, portraying the Chechen separatists as “terrorists”. As Barkawi and Laffey argue “In contemporary usage this term (terrorism) legitimates state power and delegitimizes the use of force by non-state actors. It assumes in advance that “terrorist” actions are always illegitimate and unjustified.” Instead of trying to understand resistance movements there is a tendency to label them as unreasonable, which only serves the dominant party to position itself against the “illegitimate” and demonized “Other”.

Furthermore, “if an issue is securitized — represented as an existential threat by a consequential political actor (usually a state’s leader) and accepted as such by a relevant audience (usually the domestic population) — it is ultimately elevated from the realm of ‘normal politics’ to the sphere of ‘panic politics” claim Browning and McDonald.

Conceptualizing a structure of relations through which security discourses are shaped is vital, because we can see our own standpoint and thus, approach (in)security, as Kinnvall would argue, as a “thick signifier”. Here an individual is becoming aware of “the institutional continuities within its embedded.” (Kinnvall, 2006) “Approaching security as a thick signifier means unmasking those structural relations through which security discourses are framed.” (Ibid: 26) As a result, “those who produce the



discourse also have power to make it “true” and so for instance use hegemonic stance to legitimize their dominance and marginalize others” (Kinnvall, 2006)

Another take on this, from the Feminist Security Studies, claims that the divisions of power cannot be limited in the “relations of the state elites and the international organizations or the top-down “problem solving” orientation they advocate. ” (Runyan and Peterson, 2014) On the contrary, such a stance would underline the techniques that diffuse political linkages and undermine the interests of collective interests of other identities. “It would reveal inequalities as a source of conflict in world politics and illuminate divisions within groups- as well as linkages among other groups- not only along national lines but also along gender, race, class, sexuality, and culture lines.” (Ibid: 84)

Through the lens of crisis, the concept of vulnerability is issued as one of the key aspects that contribute in our more spherical view of the security discourses. Vulnerability, as pointed out by Martha Fineman, apart from being deeply gendered, “is a universal, inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition.” (Aolain, 2011) “The presumption that generated chaos and break down of many formative structures as the result of external or internal shocks discards any analysis on masculinity, therefore to accept it as neutralized, while women experience both violence and chaos in situations of crisis.” (Aolain, 2011) In the case of Chechnya, heavy atrocities were committed against civilians, including women, but their voices have not been heard, on how they experienced the systemic oppression and war, meaning that attempts of securitization are lacking representation and therefore are not welcomed but rather enforced, creating further insecurities.

Additionally, according to Schroeder and Chappuis, “we need to seek to understand insecurity from a greater variety of perspectives if we are to hope to understand how security and insecurity are created, even in non-Western societies, [...]” (Schroeder and Chappuis, 2014)

Unfortunately, the question to frame the securitizing discourse by taking under consideration all the shades and forms that threat and insecurity appear, remains unanswered.

### *Ontological Security*

Our day- to-day life generates traction not only within our own multidimensional identities but also in the attempt to communicate with the demanding outside world. (Giddens,1991) Overwhelmed by anxieties, a “what if” factor is created, shadowing our everyday practices. (Ibid: 40) Everyday routines and practices construct and emotional acceptance of the “external world” without which, Giddens argues, secure human existence is impossible. He continues suggesting that “such acceptance is at

the same time the origin of self-identity through the learning of what is not-me” Therefore, constructing our notions of self through defining the “Other” is of course in conjunction to the “objective” reality around us. In cases of disruption of this reality, such as the cases of the political crisis, conflict and war in Chechnya and Crimea, the concept of trust is introduced by Giddens. Here, trust is viewed as the faith in oneself, “a protection against future threats and dangers which allows the individual to sustain hope and courage in the face of whatever debilitating circumstances she or he might later confront.”(Ibid: 41)

Supporting this and in an attempt to frame emotions of fear and anxiety, Van Rythoven suggests that we should “examine emotions as constraints on securitizing moves”. (Rythoven, 2015) In the annexation of Crimea, quite the opposite happened, as the generated threat of losing all liberties by the namely right wing Ukrainian government, has enacted a wave of securitization practices that disturbed the everyday life of the people of Crimea. Consequently it is understood that emotion, such as insecurity, anxiety and notions of self are scarcely fragile, as they feed from everyday life simulations and narratives, on a constant basis. On a larger scale, state imaginations and narratives overlap and usually clash with parts of our multilayered identities, generating even more anxiety in order to conform.

Furthermore, one last aspect of our conceptions of identity in relation to the state should be stressed again, one that is vital to the critical security studies discourse. We cannot proceed without underlining how our perception of the state is deeply gendered, as it is perceived as masculine, since the establishment of Security Studies in IR. Hegemonic masculinity is neutralized, leaving outside so many other fractions of reality and notions of self. Security studies discourses revive from the fact that warfare, military or state security is not the only aspect that defines security anymore. Following a more critical feminist approach the masculinist identities that have hardened around our views of gender and the physicality of our insecurities, lead usually to asphyxiation. According to Runya and Peterson in reference to “gendered divisions of imperialist power” the breaking of war and the geopolitical “othering” of regions and groups, became a code for heteronormative masculine superiority. For instance, the collective memory of the Chechen societies that have been shaped by the atrocities of war will relive the threat and fear of these events. Collective postwar trauma is not addressed so much in the critical security discourse, even though such strong emotions based on the core of existential threat and insecurity. Nonetheless the prevailing narrative that has been established, through the divisions of power, is the one of the Russian government and thus I am not sure it will ever meet the needs of the Chechen people.

As proposed by Feminist Security Scholars, the security agenda should be widened, including, what Giddens also hints, an awareness of vulnerability. Instead of creating “artificial altars, (we propose) to create space for multiple voices and ways of acting and being.” ( Runyan and Peterson,2014)

#### *IV. Conclusion*

In an era of large-scale globality, different issues in the construction of identity and therefore its securitization, arise. From human security to ontological security, our notions of self are heavily influenced by our everyday exposure to risks and threats, generated or not. Emotions of instability, insecurity and anxieties take hold, as we strive to reassure and secure our positions within power structures, political and economic interests and day-to-day tractions. Critical security studies and the discourse around them is an attempt to include and improve the dialogue around securitization, along with Feminist Security Studies. In our example cases of war and conflict, the manipulation of narratives that construct notions of self has been portrayed, as a flaw, where, even though securitizations exists, it does not cover important parts of identities that were exposed. Secession movements have been framed by Putin's administration differently in these two cases. In Chechnya any separatist movement has been perceived and projected as an act of religious extremism and terrorism. On the other hand in the case of Crimea the separatism movements have been promoted and to a certain extent even generated solemnly by the Russian government and its strategic use of soft power (media) and invasive tactics. The cracks in the identities of the people of Crimea, has been used in order to fulfill the Russian imperialist imaginations of state, as the power structure in which both countries are parts of place the Russian narrative in a hegemonic stance. We need to understand and dismantle the conceptions of state and identity that are heavily identified by hegemonic masculinities that tent to be neutralized. Re-gendering security, Aolain proposes, suggesting a conception of security which encompasses physical, social, economic and sexual security in a manner that affirms the experience and relevance of gender. (Aolain, 2011) The need for security, belonging, and enduring social ties based on trust is universal and cannot be wished away, says Eriksen and though we cannot escape objective reality, we should make sure that it is lived with dignity. Representation and advocacy are becoming more inclusive as the discourse around them continues to grow. Different narratives, and therefore notions of self, are being heard and accepted. Standing critically in a dialogue that promotes the power structures that do not serve us anymore is vital. Therefore, opening up seems like the only way to provide safety, embrace and nurture healthier aspects of living and sometimes it feels like an obligation to one's self and to their community.

Either it's night, or we don't need light.

— Thelonious Monk — Thomas Pynchon

## References

- Barkawi, T. and Laffey, M. (2006). The postcolonial moment in security studies. *Review of International Studies*, 32(02)
- Biersack, J. and O’Lear, S. (2014). The geopolitics of Russia's annexation of Crimea: narratives, identity, silences, and energy. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 55(3), pp.247-269.
- Bowring, Bill. (2018). Who Are the “Crimea People” or “People of Crimea”? The Fate of the Crimean Tatars, Russia’s Legal Justification for Annexation, and Pandora’s Box: Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello, Jus Post Bellum. 10.1007/978-94-6265-222-4\_2.
- Browning, C. and McDonald M. (2013) The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security. *The European Journal of International Relations* 19(2) 235–255.
- Schroeder Ursula C. & Chappuis Fairlie (2014) New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic Politics, *International Peacekeeping*, 21:2, 133-148, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2014.910401
- Eriksen, T. (2014). *Globalization*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Berg, pp.133-148, 153- 168.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self-identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.36-69.
- Kinnvall, C. (2009). *Globalization and religious nationalism in India*. London: Routledge, pp.11-78.
- Ni Aolain, F. (2011). Women, Vulnerability and Humanitarian Emergencies. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. [online] Available at: <http://repository.law.umich.edu/mjgl/vol18/iss1/1>.
- Rukhadze, V. and Duerr, G. (2016). Sovereignty issues in the Caucasus: contested ethnic and national identities in Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. *Sprawy Narodowościowe*, (48), pp.30-47.
- Scholte, J. (2005). *Globalization*. 2nd ed. London: Palgrave, pp.188-192, 214-218, 227-254.
- Schroeder Ursula C. & Chappuis Fairlie (2014) New Perspectives on Security Sector Reform: The Role of Local Agency and Domestic Politics, *International Peacekeeping*, 21:2, 133-148, DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2014.910401
- Runyan, A. and Peterson, V. (2014). *Global gender issues in the new millennium*. 4th ed. Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, pp.139-179.

Van Rythoven, E. (2015). Learning to feel, learning to fear? Emotions, imaginaries, and limits in the politics of securitization. *Security Dialogue* 2015, Vol 46(5), pp.458-475.

Vigh, H. (2008). Crisis and Chronicity: Anthropological Perspectives on Continuous Conflict and Decline. *Ethnos*, 73(1), pp.5-24.